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The Complexity of Coherence:
Justice LeBel’s Administrative Law
Lorne Sossin*

Canadians will deal with administrative action and justice more
often than with the civil or criminal courts in their daily life.
— Justice Louis LeBel1

I. INTRODUCTION
In Blencoe,2 Justice LeBel’s first major administrative law judgment
after joining the Supreme Court, he memorably quipped, “[N]ot all
administrative bodies are the same. Indeed, this is an understatement. At
first glance, labour boards, police commissions and milk control boards
may seem to have about as much in common as assembly lines, cops,
and cows!” It was clear a fresh voice had arrived — and at a moment of
significant upheaval and flux for Administrative Law. But few predicted
just how significantly Justice LeBel would transform key aspects of
the field.
In the 20 or so significant administrative law judgments that
followed Blencoe, Justice LeBel carved out a distinctive approach to
Administrative Law, one characterized by the search for analytic
coherence in a field, as he noted above, defined by its diversity. While far
more space would be needed to fully engage with Justice LeBel’s many
*
Dean and Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am grateful to Davina
Finn, J.D./M.B.A. ’16 for her helpful research assistance for this article. I am also indebted to Jula
Hughes for her invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this article as well as the organizers and
participants of the Workshop on the Legacy of Louis LeBel held at the University of Toronto on
October 17, 2014.
1
Speech given by Justice LeBel to CLEBC Administrative Law Conference on October 26,
2012, published in the Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practice (2013), at 51-66, online:
<http://administrativejusticereform.ca/lebel-j-perhaps-stronger-constitutional-protection-foradministrative-tribunals/>.
2
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000]
2 S.C.R. 307, at para. 158 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Blencoe”].
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contributions to administrative law, the analysis that follows will focus
on the standard of review doctrine, as it is hard to think of a field of law
more affected by his tenure on the Court.
Beginning with concurring judgments in Chamberlain3 and Toronto
(City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.), Local 79,4
Justice LeBel took issue with the prevailing approach to the standard of
review (both its methodology and application). His concern was not only
the lack of coherence in the field as it had then been developed, but he
also worried, relatedly, about the predictability and workability of the
analytic framework whose creation was primarily the responsibility of
the Supreme Court. More than just the important content, Justice LeBel
also brought a distinctive analytic authenticity to his signature administrative
law judgments. His judgments during this period were more inquisitive than
authoritative, reflecting his intellectual curiosity and search for clarity.
Justice LeBel finally had the opportunity to develop his own vision
of the standard of review in Dunsmuir,5 the landmark administrative law
judgment he authored jointly with Bastarache J. While the dust has yet to
settle on what has come to be known as the Dunsmuir Framework,
Justice LeBel’s pursuit of simplicity, transparency and coherence has
reinvigorated Canadian administrative law and clarified its practice for
advocates, adjudicators and academics alike. At the same time, however,
Justice LeBel may have achieved greater analytic clarity at the risk of
glossing over the very contextual resonance he first articulated so
colourfully in Blencoe. Put differently, the problem may not be with
Justice LeBel’s vision, but with the lens itself, and whether the judicial
process, with its inherent constraints of experience and evidence, can do
justice to the lived realities of the administrative state.
This article is divided into three sections and a conclusion. In the first
section, I canvass Justice LeBel’s evolving vision of administrative law
and his growing focus on the standard of review. In the second section,
I focus on Dunsmuir and some of the subsequent cases which sought to
refine (and amplify) the path which Dunsmuir charted. In the third section,
I elaborate on the implications of Justice LeBel’s vision of Canadian
administrative law and the inherent tension with that vision between
3

Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, 2002 SCC 86, at
paras. 199-215 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chamberlain”].
4
[2003] S.C.J. No. 64, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, at paras. 60-135 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Toronto
(City)”].
5
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, 2008 SCC 9 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Dunsmuir”].
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coherent judicial principle and diverse context and settings for
administrative law practice in Canada.

II. JUSTICE LEBEL’S EVOLVING VISION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S EVOLUTION
It is often said that administrative law is the most interesting and
important area of law precisely because it is about every other area of
law too. At its broadest, any exercise of statutory or public power by any
official in any context engages administrative law principles (e.g., labour,
immigration, banking, social benefits, taxation, national security, etc.).
This breadth presents certain complications when attempting to
discuss the body of work of a Supreme Court Justice. For this reason,
I have limited my discussion to a certain group of “core” administrative
law cases where Justice LeBel authored or co-authored a substantively
significant decision. I have no doubt such an analysis seriously
underestimates his influence on the field — both through decisions to
which he contributed through deliberations and comments on drafts but
did not author, and through his various speeches and writings on
administrative law, only a few examples of which are referenced in the
discussion below.
Before turning to Justice LeBel’s judgments, it is important to
understand his enduring fascination (and, some would say, fixation) on
the standard of review within administrative law. The standard of review
addresses how and when courts may interfere with the actions of
statutory decision-makers, whether through appeals set out in statutory
schemes or through judicial review of administrative decision-making.
As Justices LeBel and Bastarache note in Dunsmuir, the standard of
review is first and foremost a key instantiation of the rule of law.6 The
rule of law dictates that all government authority must have a source in
law, and therefore that courts have an inherent jurisdiction to review all
exercises of government authority to ensure the legal limits of that
authority have not been exceeded.
At the same time, the standard of review reflects democratic
commitments, and the obligation of the courts to defer to the intent of the
legislature to endow administrative decision-makers with legal authority,

6

Id., at paras. 27-28.
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and in some cases, broad discretion. Finally, the standard of review
engages the changing realities of the administrative state, where courts
have come increasingly to recognize the expertise of various policy,
regulatory and discretionary bodies relative to the judicial role.
While rooted in enduring principles, the standard of review doctrine
has been dynamic rather than static — it is an evolving, multi-headed
hydra precisely because of the virtually unbounded diversity of
administrative decision-making. As Iacobucci J. observed, the complexity
of the standard of review lies not in the conceptual framework of a
spectrum of standards, but in its application to the myriad delegated
powers of decision: “... The complexity was created not by the courts but
by the legislators, who wisely decided that not all administrative agencies
would operate in the same way. It is a complexity that the courts must
attempt to deal with and it would be irresponsible simply for judges to
wish it away.”7
For example, the attempt at synthesis in cases such as Ryan,8
involving the review of tribunals, had unravelled by the time of
Dunsmuir, a mere five years later. Similarly, the apparent clarity around
the standard of review for administrative discretion in Baker9 had to be
revisited and clarified again as early as in Suresh.10 Justice LeBel not
only witnessed these twists and turns, but acted as a key catalyst for
rethinking the doctrine so as to create a more enduring framework. Early
on, Justice LeBel seemed to realize that the path to progress would be
one of creative destruction of the then-existing standard of review
framework.
In Chamberlain, for example, writing sole concurring reasons,
Justice LeBel reviewed the then-governing “pragmatic and functional”
methodology for determining which of the three standards of review then
recognized would apply in a given decision-making context (patent
unreasonableness was the most deferential standard, correctness was the
least deferential and reasonableness simpliciter was a standard

7

The Honourable Justice Iacobucci, “Articulating a Rational Standard of Review Doctrine:
A Tribute to John Willis” (2002) 27 Queens L.J. 859-78, at 872 [hereinafter “Iacobucci,
‘Articulating a Rational Standard”’].
8
Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] S.C.J. No. 17, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247
(S.C.C.).
9
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999]
2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Baker”].
10
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, 2002
SCC 1 (S.C.C.).
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somewhere in the middle of this spectrum of deference). Chamberlain
involved the review of a school board decision involving elementary
school curriculum materials and Justice LeBel questioned the usefulness
of the pragmatic and functional approach in the context of policy
decisions made by elected municipal councils. He observed:
When the administrative body whose decision is challenged is not a
tribunal, but an elected body with delegated power to make policy
decisions, the primary function of judicial review is to determine
whether that body acted within the bounds of the authority conferred on
it. Courts must respect the responsibility of such bodies to serve those
who elected them, and will, as a rule, interpret their statutory powers
generously (see Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City),
[1994] 1 S.C.R. 231, at p. 244, per McLachlin J. (as she then was);
Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 342, 2000
SCC 13, at para. 36; 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Societe
d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, at para. 23). The
decisions or actions of an administrative body of this kind will be
invalidated if they are plainly contrary to the express or implied
limitations on its powers. The mechanical application, in this context,
of a test which was developed with a quite different kind of
administrative body in mind is not only unnecessary, but may also lead
both to practical difficulties and to uncertainties about the proper basis
of judicial review.11

Justice LeBel’s critique raised a more fundamental challenge to the
direction the Supreme Court was bringing to Canadian administrative law,
largely under the leadership of then Justice Iacobucci.12 That challenge
was whether the same standard of review should apply for all manner of
administrative decisions, from regulatory to adjudicative, policy to factual,
immigration officer to Minister, regulatory to discretionary. As Justice
LeBel put it, “... In certain circumstances, such as those at issue in
Chamberlain itself, applying this methodological approach in order to

11

Chamberlain, supra, note 3, at para. 191 (S.C.C.).
For some contemporaneous reflections, see Iacobucci, “Articulating a Rational Standard”,
supra, note 7; L. Sossin, “Empty Ritual, Mechanical Exercise or the Discipline of Deference?:
Revisiting the Standard of Review in Administrative Law” (2003) 27 Advocates’ Q. 478; and
D. Mullan, “Baker and Deference: Interpreting the Conflicting Signals” in D. Dyzenhaus, ed., The
Unity of Public Law (London: Hart, 2003). For more background on Iacobucci J.’s contributions, see
L. Sossin & C. Flood, “The Contextual Turn: Iacobucci’s Legacy and the Standard of Review in
Administrative Law” (Special Issue, Spring 2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 581.
12
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determine the appropriate standard of review may in fact obscure the real
issue before the reviewing court.”13
In Toronto (City), Justice LeBel (writing in a concurring judgment)
acknowledged the “growing criticism” and “serious concerns” about the
Court’s standard of review case law.14 That judgment reflects what
I characterized above as Justice LeBel’s analytic authenticity.
While the standard of review questions in the case at bar were
uncontroversial (indeed, the Court was unanimous that a patently
unreasonable standard applied and that it had been infringed by the
arbitrator whose decision was impugned), and while the parties had not
made submissions on the broader standard of review framework,
Justice LeBel observed, that “The Court cannot remain unresponsive to
sustained concerns or criticism coming from the legal community in
relation to the state of Canadian jurisprudence in this important part of
the law.”15 While the majority judgment (authored by Arbour J.)
dispensed with the standard of review in four paragraphs,16 Justice LeBel
devoted 75 paragraphs to his detailed examination of the issue.
Justice LeBel responded to the concerns he identified in a reflective
and comprehensive analysis which cast doubt on the entire structure of
the Court’s standard of review jurisprudence.17 Justice LeBel described
the distinction between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness
simpliciter as “nebulous”,18 and characterized the relationship between
13

Toronto (City), supra, note 4, at para. 61 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 64.
15
Id., at para. 64.
16
Justice Arbour had the benefit of reviewing Justice LeBel’s reasons and offered the
following comment:
My colleague LeBel J. discusses at length our jurisprudence on standards of review.
He reviews concerns and criticisms about the three standard system of judicial review.
Given that these issues were not argued before us in this case, and without the benefit of a
full adversarial debate, I would not wish to comment on the desirability of a departure
from our recently affirmed framework for standards of review analysis. (See this Court’s
unanimous decisions of Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British
Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 19, and Law Society of New Brunswick v.
Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC 20.).
Id., at para. 12.
17
For another example of this critique, see the judgment of Justice LeBel in Voice
Construction Ltd. v. Construction & General Workers’ Union, Local 92, [2004] S.C.J. No. 2, 2004
SCC 23, at paras. 39-42 (S.C.C.).
18
Toronto (City), supra, note 4, at para. 65 (S.C.C.). On this point, after reviewing in-depth
the attempts to distinguish the two types of reasonableness review, Justice LeBel:
In the end, the essential question remains the same under both standards: was the decision
of the adjudicator taken in accordance with reason? Where the answer is no, for instance
because the legislation in question cannot rationally support the adjudicator’s interpretation,
14
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patent unreasonableness and correctness as “blurred”. In one passage, he
observed:
At times the Court’s application of the standard of patent unreasonableness
may leave it vulnerable to criticism that it may in fact be doing implicitly
what it has rejected explicitly: intervening in decisions that are, in its view,
incorrect, rather than limiting any intervention to those decisions that lack a
rational foundation. In the process, what should be an indelible line
between correctness, on the one hand, and patent unreasonableness, on the
other, becomes blurred. It may very well be that review under any standard
of reasonableness, given the nature of the intellectual process it involves,
entails such a risk. Nevertheless, the existence of two standards of
reasonableness appears to have magnified the underlying tension between
the two standards of reasonableness and correctness.19

While he could have left the discussion at this point, instead he pursued
the point to its logical end. He added:
There is no easy way out of this conundrum. Whatever attempts are made
to clarify the contours of, or the relationship between, the existing
definitional strands of patent unreasonableness, this standard and
reasonableness simpliciter will continue to be rooted in a shared rationale:
statutory language is often ambiguous and ‘admits of more than one
possible meaning’; provided that the expert administrative adjudicator’s
interpretation ‘does not move outside the bounds of reasonably permissible
visions of the appropriate interpretation, there is no justification for court
intervention’ (Mullan, ‘Recent Developments in Standard of Review’,
supra, at p. 18). It will thus remain difficult to keep these standards
conceptually distinct, and I query whether, in the end, the theoretical efforts
necessary to do so are productive. Obviously any decision that fails the test
of patent unreasonableness must also fall on a standard of reasonableness
simpliciter, but it seems hard to imagine situations where the converse is
not also true: if a decision is not supported by a tenable explanation and is
thus unreasonable) (Ryan, supra, at para. 55), how likely is it that it could

the error will invalidate the decision, regardless of whether the standard applied is
reasonableness simpliciter or patent unreasonableness (see D. K. Lovett, ‘That Curious
Curial Deference Just Gets Curiouser and Curiouser — Canada (Director of
Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.’ (1997), 55 Advocate (B.C.) 541, at p. 545).
Because the two variants of reasonableness are united at their theoretical source, the
imperative for the reviewing court to intervene will turn on the conclusion that the
adjudicator’s decision deviates from what falls within the ambit of the reasonable, not on
‘fine distinctions’ between the test for patent unreasonableness and reasonableness
simpliciter (see Flazon, supra, at p. 33).
Id., at para. 108.
19
Id., at para. 99.
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be sustained on ‘any reasonable interpretation of the facts or of the law’
(and thus not be patently unreasonable) (National Corn Growers, supra, at
pp. 1369-70, per Gonthier J.)?20

Justice LeBel concluded his analysis by calling for administrative law to
continue its “evolution”. With a concern for coherence, predictability and
workability in mind, he raised the possibility of a turning back of the
clock to a time when deference was an “on-off” switch, under which a
court would either show deference or decide not to show deference to an
administrative decision.21 He explored this view further outside the
context of Supreme Court judgments in “Some Properly Deferential
Thoughts on Deference”.22 A few short years later, he would have the
opportunity to apply his preferred approach to the next milestone in the
evolution of the standard of review in Canadian administrative law.

III. DUNSMUIR AND THE NEW AND IMPROVED
STANDARD OF REVIEW ANALYSIS
In arguably the most significant decision for Canadian administrative
law since the Supreme Court’s 1999 Baker decision, the majority decision in
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, authored by Bastarache J. and Justice LeBel,
delivered the very overhaul Justice LeBel had urged in Toronto (City):
The two types of judicial review, on the merits and on the process, are
therefore engaged in this case. Our review of the system will therefore
be comprehensive, which is preferable since a holistic approach is
needed when dealing with fundamental principles.23

The majority judgment in Dunsmuir reduced the number of review
standards in Canadian administrative law from three to two with “patent
unreasonableness” disappearing from the lexicon. There would now
simply be a deferential standard, known as reasonableness, and the
standard of correctness which conveyed less deference.
The judgment also renamed the methodology to be employed in
determining the standard of review from the “pragmatic and functional
analysis” to the “standard of review analysis”. While the test has a new
name, its content is the same, and involves a consideration of four factors:
20
21
22
23

Id., at para. 121.
Id., at para. 134.
(2008) 21 C.J.A.L.P. 1.
Dunsmuir, supra, note 5, at para. 26.
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(1) the presence or absence of a privative clause; (2) the purpose of the
tribunal in light of the enabling legislation; (3) the nature of the question at
issue; and (4) the expertise of the tribunal. Although the Court had insisted
that all factors be considered in all cases under the earlier approach,
Justices LeBel and Bastarache clarified that not all factors will need to be
considered under the standard of review analysis, as a particular factor
may on its own be determinative of the reasonableness standard.
Importantly, the judgment envisions recourse to this standard of
review methodology only where the standard of review has not already
been established by previous jurisprudence, and where the standard is not
clear on its face, where for example, “true questions of jurisdiction” is
involved, or where a question of law that is both of “central importance
to the legal system as a whole” is at issue.
Taken together, these changes streamline and simplify the standard
of review analysis, though there is no suggestion in Dunsmuir that any
previous standard of review decision would have had a different outcome
or would not remain good law.
Dunsmuir was a New Brunswick public servant, dismissed and given
four and a half months salary in lieu of notice. The Government relied on
section 20 of the Civil Service Act24 which provided that “[s]ubject to the
provisions of this Act and any other Act” termination of any employee
“shall be governed by the ordinary rules of contract”. According to the
Government, this meant it could dismiss Dunsmuir simply by providing
him with reasonable notice or salary in lieu thereof. It did not have to
establish cause or give him a hearing before dismissing him.
While Dunsmuir was dismissed because he was deemed not suitable
for the position he was occupying, he grieved the decision, contesting
both the notice period and whether the dismissal was actually for cause
(in which case additional procedural rights would be triggered by statute).
In a preliminary ruling, the adjudicator rejected the Government’s
challenge and finding that Dunsmuir’s dismissal was related to his work
performance, ordered that the Government reinstate Dunsmuir as of the
date of dismissal because it had dismissed him without a hearing. On an
application for judicial review,25 the motions court judge determined that
the appropriate standard of review was correctness and set aside the
adjudicator’s decision on the preliminary motion as incorrect in law.
24

S.N.B. 1984, c. C-5.1.
Nouveau-Brunswick (Conseil de gestion) c. Dunsmuir, [2005] N.B.J. No. 327, 2005
NBQB 270 (N.B.Q.B.).
25
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The Court of Appeal sustained that decision but on the basis that
unreasonableness was the appropriate standard of review.26
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the lower courts’ decision.
A majority of the Court found the standard of review to be reasonableness
and that the adjudicator’s decision was unreasonable as a matter of law.
Three of the judges (Deschamps J., Charron and Rothstein JJ. concurring)
reached the same conclusion on the basis of correctness review.
Justices LeBel and Bastarache described the reasonableness review
in the following terms:
a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the
development of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain
questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend
themselves to one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise
to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a
margin of appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational
solutions. A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquiries into
the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the
process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review,
reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But
it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law.27

For the majority, the decision did not meet this standard because the
adjudicator inquired into the reasons for the discharge of Dunsmuir, an
inquiry inconsistent on any reading with the employment contract which
governed Dunsmuir’s relationship as a non-unionized employee to the
employer. In short, the adjudicator had treated a matter of private law as
if it were a matter of public law.
All nine members of the Court held that those in Dunsmuir’s position
have no entitlement to procedural fairness as a pre-condition of effective
dismissal. The procedural fairness aspect of the decision represented an
overturning of earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence and confirmed that
fairness issues in the context of public office holders should be
appropriately addressed through private employment law principles. In

26
Nouveau-Brunswick (Conseil de gestion) c. Dunsmuir, [2006] N.B.J. No. 118, 2006
NBCA 27 (N.B.C.A.).
27
Dunsmuir, supra, note 5, at para. 47 (S.C.C.).
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Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19,28 the Court held a public
law duty of fairness arose when a statutory employee, who served at the
pleasure of the School Division, was dismissed. That decision, in turn,
built on Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk (Regional) Police Commissioners,29
which confirmed fairness duties in the context of public employment. As
a result, Dunsmuir reversed Knight.
Justices LeBel and Bastarache’s attempt to cohere the standard
of review was subject to critique within the decision itself, notably
by Binnie J., in concurring reasons, who noted that while the majority
ambitiously seeks to revisit the standard of review system as a whole,
their framework focuses exclusively on adjudicative tribunals. In one of
the more memorable lines from any administrative law judgment, Binnie J.
observed, “... [j]udicial review is an idea that has lately become unduly
burdened with law office metaphysics.”30
Justice Binnie questioned whether the Dunsmuir framework could be
easily applied to discretionary decisions by ministers or “lesser officials”
working in the “bowels and recesses of government departments”.31 For
Binnie J., the “nature of the question” is more than one of several factors
to be considered; rather, it drives any determination of what kinds of
reasonable outcomes a decision-maker is authorized to make.
Another critical strand was highlighted by Deschamps J. who, joined
by Rothstein J. and Charron J., argued for an even simpler and more
straightforward statutory interpretation approach, and one based in long
established doctrines of appellate review of trial decisions. Where an
administrative decision concerns a question of fact or mixed fact and law,
for Deschamps J., deference should normally follow. Where the decision
involves a question of law, the analysis as to whether deference is
warranted should be based on statutory interpretation principles.
Thus, while Dunsmuir aspires for a comprehensive revision of the
standard of review doctrine, the central critiques — that it fails to engage
with complexity on the one hand, and simplicity on the other hand,
are apparent in the concurring judgments themselves. The tantalizing
question Dunsmuir raises but arguably fails to resolve is whether
complexity and simplicity can be embraced under the standard of review
doctrine. I return to this notion below in the fourth section of this article.
28
29
30
31

[1990] S.C.J. No. 26, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Knight”].
[1978] S.C.J. No. 88, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.).
Dunsmuir, supra, note 5, at para. 122 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 136.
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While Justice LeBel took active roles in other areas of Administrative
Law in the years that followed, applying, refining and defending the
Dunsmuir framework characterized most of his reasons in subsequent
cases in the field.

IV. THE IMAGINATION OF JUSTICE LEBEL’S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
While the most significant cases exploring the impact of Dunsmuir
have been authored by other members of the Court (for example, Binnie J.
authored the majority reasons in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)
v. Khosa,32 which featured two further concurring sets of reasons and
dissenting reasons all seeking to interpret Dunsmuir in the context of the
statutory standard of review set out in the Federal Courts Act),33 Justice
LeBel has returned to the standard of review analysis in various contexts.
In Montréal (City) v. Montreal Port Authority,34 Justice LeBel authored
a unanimous judgment considering statutory discretion exercised by a
Crown Corporation in relation to a municipal taxation scheme. Justice
LeBel confirmed that the reasonableness standard is particularly wellsuited to the exercise of discretion where there is more than one possible
course of action. In this case, he concluded the decision was not
reasonable as the approach taken by the Crown Corporation accorded
neither to the statutory framework nor Parliament’s intent.
In Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney
General),35 Justices LeBel and Cromwell, writing for the majority, apply
the standard of review in the context of a human rights tribunal exercising
its authority to award costs. While acknowledging this is a question of law,
Justices LeBel and Cromwell view the question as one within the
Tribunal’s home statute and not one that rises to the exception created in
Dunsmuir for declining deference where a question of central importance
for the legal system is at issue. The majority concludes that even viewed
through the most generous interpretation, the power of the Tribunal to
redress costs incurred by victims of discrimination cannot extend to legal

32

[2009] S.C.J. No. 12, 2009 SCC 12 (S.C.C.).
For an excellent review of the challenges of applying Dunsmuir in subsequent case law,
see Paul Daly, “The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in Canadian Administrative Law”
(2012) 50 Osgoode Hall L.J. 317-57.
34
[2010] S.C.J. No. 14, 2010 SCC 14 (S.C.C.).
35
[2011] S.C.J. No. 53, 2011 SCC 53 (S.C.C.).
33
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expenses. While this case represents a welcome clarification of the scope
of “questions central to the legal system”, it also reveals the kinds of new
metaphysics Binnie J. warned about in Dunsmuir, focusing more on the
nomenclature to which Dunsmuir has given rise and less on the spectrum
of deference and its underlying rationales.
In Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),36
Justice LeBel, writing for a unanimous Court, summarized and applied
the Dunsmuir framework in exactly the kind of discretionary context
Binnie J. argued Dunsmuir had failed to consider. Agraira involved a
ministerial decision to deny relief to a Libyan national who had been
found inadmissible to Canada because of his sustained contact with a
terrorist organization. The statute provided for ministerial relief of this
decision, which Agraira sought. In determining the appropriate standard
of review for the Minister’s decision to deny the discretionary relief
requested, Justice LeBel set out that a court needs to engage in a two-step
process: first, the Court must determine whether the standard of review
has been established satisfactorily in the existing jurisprudence; and
second, and only if the answer to the first question is “no”, the Court
must perform a full standard of review analysis.
Justice LeBel found that in the ministerial context at issue in
Agraira, the standard of review had been satisfactorily determined in
past decisions to be reasonableness. The Minister’s interpretation of
“national interest” in the legislation to include national security concerns
was found to be reasonable, notwithstanding a recommendation from
staff in the Ministry that the relief be granted based on the circumstances
of the case, and in particular the minimal contact between Agraira and
the terrorist organization.37 Justice LeBel highlighted that it was open to
the Minister to interpret the “national interest” term in the manner he did
and that this did not mean other factors set out in a ministry guideline
were not considered as well. The fact that the Minister’s determination
differed from his staff’s recommendations could not in itself lead to the
conclusion that the Minister was acting unreasonably in exercising his
discretion. While critics were perhaps justified in worrying that the
collapse of patent unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter
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the Environment), [2003] S.C.J. No. 59, 2003 SCC 58 (S.C.C.).
37

158

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2015) 70 S.C.L.R. (2d)

standards in Dunsmuir might invite greater judicial intervention, Justice
LeBel’s post-Dunsmuir decisions reflect a robust appreciation of deference,
particularly in relation to ministerial discretion. Indeed, some have
argued judicial review where national security is involved (particularly
post-9/11) has been overly deferential.38 The aspect of Agraira with
implications more far-reaching than the standard of review, however,
relates to the place of soft law in the framework of administrative law.
Dating back at least to the Baker decision, the Court approached the
existence of ministerial guidelines (which, because they are developed by
the executive body itself and not promulgated through legislation or
regulations, cannot be treated as binding) as playing a role in the
reasonableness analysis. In other words, in Baker, the Court found the
decision to deport Ms. Baker was inconsistent with the applicable
guideline which indicated parents would not be separated from their
children. This inconsistency was treated as one of several indicia of
unreasonableness in the exercise of ministerial discretion in that context.39
In Agraira, the issue should not have arisen, as Justice LeBel found that
the ministerial decision at issue was not inconsistent with the applicable
guidelines and therefore could not form a basis for concluding the exercise
of discretion was unreasonable. In a brief section at the end of his reasons,
however, Justice LeBel indicated (arguably, in obiter) that a publicly
issued guideline setting out clear procedures to which the decisionmaker committed to follow could give rise to legitimate expectations.40 As
confirmed in Baker, legitimate expectations cannot create a fairness
obligation that does not otherwise exist, but can expand or amplify an
existing fairness obligation where the affected individual is promised a
particular procedure or substantive result.41 Justice LeBel’s reference to
guidelines creating a legitimate expectation in Agraira begs far more
questions than it resolves. Why would legitimate expectations arise only
from procedural guidelines and not substantive ones? Does recognizing
guidelines as giving rise to legitimate expectations mean some guidelines
(e.g., procedural ones) can be treated as binding? What is the significance in
this context of a guideline being “publicly” available? Should a guideline

38
See David Mullan, “Deference from Baker to Suresh and Beyond: Interpreting the
Conflicting Signals” in D. Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity of Public Law (London: Hart, 2004), at 21.
39
Baker, supra, note 9, at paras. 72-75.
40
Agraira, supra, note 36, at para. 101.
41
Baker, supra, note 9, at para. 26.
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obligating a decision-maker to follow a particular procedure that is not
public be more easily disregarded?
The way in which Agraira might revive the relevance of soft law and
the relevance of the law of legitimate expectations will have to await
subsequent application. In an odd way, the way in which Justice LeBel
raised the legitimate expectation issue in Agraira is reminiscent of his first
reference to his doubts about the standard of review in Chamberlain — as
an aside in a case where the reference was not determinative to the outcome
of the case. Justice LeBel’s analytic authenticity unfolds alongside his
intellectual curiosity and an overarching vision of accountability through
administrative law.
In his final administrative law judgment, in Mission Institution v.
Khela,42 Justice LeBel considered the argument that “Dunsmuir
Reasonableness” review cannot apply to a decision of prison authorities
on a habeas corpus application. Rejecting this premise, Justice LeBel
reviewed the decision to transfer an inmate to a maximum security
facility on a standard of reasonableness. Notwithstanding the important
legal interests at stake, Justice LeBel argued a failure to apply deference
would lead to courts micro-managing prisons. Ultimately, Justice LeBel
did not need to apply the unreasonableness standard as he found the
transfer decision at issue was unlawful on procedural fairness grounds.
Another dimension of the Khela decision was the determination that
jurisdiction over habeas corpus applications could be shared between
federal and provincial courts. While this decision appears to cut against
the goal of coherence (shared jurisdiction can lead to re-litigation and
inconsistent decisions), it advances the sometimes competing goal of
access to justice by ensuring multiple avenues of redress.43 In this sense,
Khela represents a last affirmation that coherence is necessary in the
development of administrative law, but not always sufficient.
There is a clear arc to Justice LeBel’s design of the standard of
review doctrine, from his early cri de coeur calling for greater coherence
in Chamberlain and Toronto (City), through to his comprehensive and
principled overhaul of the standard of review analysis in Dunsmuir, and
subsequent refinements and applications in his last judgments. While it is
too early to offer definitive conclusions on how enduring the Dunsmuir
analysis will turn out to be, it is clear that by the time of his retirement,
42
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Justice LeBel had emerged as a leading architect of the Court’s approach
to administrative law. That approach is rooted in a responsive and clearly
articulated analytic framework.
In a paper written for a conference in honour of retiring Justice
Iacobucci, Colleen Flood and I mapped out what we argued was a way to
marry the desire for simplicity in the standard of review analysis with an
embrace of diversity and the complexity to which it inevitably gives rise.
We looked for inspiration to the other grand doctrine of Canadian
administrative law — procedural fairness. While the standard of review
has been mired in the aforementioned metaphysics, the duty of fairness
has come to be seen as a spectrum of varying obligations which may be
adapted to any setting involving an administrative decision-maker. Baker
may not have stood the test of time as a decision synthesizing the
standard of review for exercises of administrative discretion, but its
synthesis of the threshold, degree and content of fairness remains
the well-spring for the duty of fairness 15 years later. Both the fairness
and standard of review doctrines balance the primacy of legislative
intent with non-exemptible minimum standards of legality. Why then
have they diverged so strikingly within the same context of Canadian
administrative law?
One of the reasons for the success of the Court’s fairness
jurisprudence is its aversion to imposing fixed categories on the myriad
points along the spectrum of fairness where particular decisions (in light
of the decision-maker, the statutory scheme, the expectation of those
affected by the decision, and the impact of the decision on their lives)
might fall. While the Court has spoken generally of minimal, medium
and high degrees of fairness, there has been no attempt to define and
distinguish these terms from one another. Rather, they are simply
directional beacons as to how onerous fairness obligations are to be
depending on the context. This demonstrates the potential of the judicial
role when it builds on the lived realities of administrative justice, rather
than trying to fit the roundness of that lived experience into the
squareness of juridical categories.
While an approach contemplating multiple points of deference along
a principled spectrum stood in stark contrast to Iacobucci J.’s categorical
approach to the standard of review, I would argue it represents the
fulfilment of Justice LeBel’s search for coherence in the complexity of
the administrative state.
I am not suggesting the standard of review analysis need look
identical to the fairness analysis. Rather, I am suggesting deference is
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(and ought to be) a far more variable concept than it has been currently
envisioned. It is more than the distinction between correctness review
and reasonableness review.
What would such an approach look like? An example may be found
in New Zealand, and the decision of its High Court in Wolf v. Minister of
Immigration.44 Mirroring some aspects of Baker, that case involved a
review of a deportation decision which would have the effect of
separating a father from his two children. Justice Wild found the
significance of the decision to the affected father should be considered in
determining the standard of reasonableness to be applied by the
reviewing court in the case. Justice Wild summarized the approach to be
followed in the following passage:
Whether a reviewing Court considers a decision reasonable and
therefore lawful, or unreasonable and therefore unlawful and invalid,
depends on the nature of the decision: upon who made it; by what
process; what the decision involves (ie its subject matter and the level
of policy content in it) and the importance of the decision to those
affected by it, in terms of its potential impact upon, or consequences
for, them.45

While no Canadian court has yet adapted the fairness analysis to inform
the standard of review in this fashion, there have been glimmers that the
Canadian Supreme Court is open to exploring points of intersection
between the fairness analysis and the Dunsmuir analysis. In Newfoundland
and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury
Board),46 Abella J., wrote for a unanimous Court about the relationship
between the Dunsmuir analysis and the quality of reasons provided by a
tribunal (which had been viewed primarily through the lens of the
variable duty of fairness post-Baker):
This, I think, is the context for understanding what the Court meant in
Dunsmuir when it called for ‘justification, transparency and intelligibility’.
To me, it represents a respectful appreciation that a wide range of
specialized decision-makers routinely render decisions in their respective
spheres of expertise, using concepts and language often unique to
their areas and rendering decisions that are often counter-intuitive to a
generalist ....
44
[2004] NZAR 414 (H.C.), per Wild J. I am grateful to Professor Hanna Wilberg of the
University of Auckland for bringing this case and its significance for this argument to my attention.
45
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46
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Read as a whole, I do not see Dunsmuir as standing for the proposition
that the ‘adequacy’ of reasons is a stand-alone basis for quashing a
decision, or as advocating that a reviewing court undertake two discrete
analyses — one for the reasons and a separate one for the result (Donald
J. M. Brown and John M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative
Action in Canada (loose-leaf), at §§12:5330 and 12:5510). It is a more
organic exercise — the reasons must be read together with the outcome
and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls within a
range of possible outcomes. This, it seems to me, is what the Court was
saying in Dunsmuir when it told reviewing courts to look at ‘the qualities
that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of
articulating the reasons and to outcomes’ (para. 47).
... if the reasons allow the reviewing court to understand why the tribunal
made its decision and permit it to determine whether the conclusion is
within the range of acceptable outcomes, the Dunsmuir criteria are met.47

Just as the duty to provide reasons will vary according to the degree of
fairness appropriate to particular decision-making contexts, so the
scrutiny of those reasons may vary according to the degree of deference
appropriate to particular decision-making contexts. Deference, in other
words, is a concept that need not be an on-off switch. Just as there may
be varying degrees of intensity in an analysis of fairness (where one
setting might require full disclosure and an oral hearing, another may be
fair if there is simply notice and an opportunity to be heard in writing),
so deference may be adapted to various circumstances. This does not put
judges in the position of having to divine the distinction between two
levels of unreasonableness, as had been the undoing of the pre-Dunsmuir
pragmatic and functional era, but it does mean that a minister making a
discretionary policy decision may be entitled to more deference than that
same minister making a discretionary decision engaging legal rights.
Deference may well be justified in both cases, but more deference ought
to attach to the policy determination.
While Justice LeBel himself may not agree with this approach, it is
one very much inspired by his call for coherence in a world of decisionmakers affecting assembly lines, cops and cows.

47
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V. CONCLUSION
While Justice LeBel largely (though not fully) delivered on his
ambitious goal of coherence in the categorical approach to the standard
of review, the approach itself can only take root if it resonates with the
lived realities of administrative decision-making. Justice LeBel rightly
characterized the rule of law and democratic commitments as the twin
pillars of the standard of review (and, I would add, of administrative law
more broadly). The project I believe he has left for the next generation of
thought leaders is to balance these in a way that does justice both to the
enduring and the evolving context of administrative law.48

48
For an attempt to take up this ambitious challenge, see Paul Daly, A Theory of Deference
in Administrative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

